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Article 8

INSPECTIONS BY ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES:
CLARIFICATION OF THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT
I. Introduction
Adminstrative agencies at all levels of government have important responsibilities for the protection of public health, safety, and welfare. One of the
devices by which these responsibilities are carried out is the administrative inspection. Although such inspections may result in severe penalties for uncovered
violations, their major function is preventative. Discovery of fire code violations and punishment of the violators achieve little if a city block has been
reduced to ashes; similarly if thousands of cases of contaminated food have
entered the market, the violation may be discovered too late to prevent mass food
poisoning. But if large scale inspection programs to determine whether there
is compliance with regulatory laws are to be possible, they cannot be subjected to the rigorous standards which searches in the area of criminal law must
meet. Since they are official intrusions, however, a tension of values is created by
administrative searches between the right to privacy and public need for inspections.
Prior to 1967, only one case had ever held that administrative searches without a warrant were not reasonable within the meaning of the fourth amendment.'
In 1967, however, the Supreme Court extended the warrant requirement of the
fourth amendment to area inspections of private dwellings to enforce health
ordinances in Camara v. Municipal Court,2 and made the same extension to inspections of business premises by fire inspectors in See v. City of Seattle.5 Since
then, there have been three Supreme Court decisions modifying and clarifying
the 1967 cases which first imposed upon administrative searches a warrant requirement. 4
The 1967 decisions, because they assumed most inspections would proceed
on consent and because the standard of probable cause which they established
seemed to offer little of the protection normally associated with warrant procedures, left considerable doubt as to what the Supreme Court had achieved.
Three members of the Court itself criticized the majority's approach as amounting to no more than mere formalism, inconveniencing agencies, and offering little
real security to those subject to inspection.5 In the lower courts arguments were
made for the application to administrative inspections of the stringent requirements of the criminal law in regard to warrants.6 In response, the Court has
limited its original formulation of the warrant requirement by carving out a
few broad exceptions.
1 District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1949); see Annot., 13 A.L.R.2d
969 (1950).
2 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
3 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
4 United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 "(1972); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971);
Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. (1970).

5 387 U.S. at 554-55 (Clark, Harlan & Stewart, JJ., dissenting).
6 See, e.g., United States v. Thriftimart, Inc., 429 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1970); United

States v. Hammond Milling Co., 413 F.2d 608 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Greenberg,

334 F. Supp. 364 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
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The most recent and significant exception is that created by the Court in
United States v. Biswell,' holding that, in the case of regulatory inspection systems, the legality of an inspection depends upon the authority of a statute that
carefully limits the time, place, and scope of the authorized search.' In so deciding, the Court returned almost full circle to its position prior to 1967 in the broad
area of regulatory inspection under statutory authority.
Whether the later cases represent a clarification or a retreat depends upon
the intention of the Court in 1967. Comments upon Biswell view the decision
as a significant curtailment of the protections granted to administrative inspections by Camara and See.' However, if attention is not focused merely upon the
warrant requirement by which the Court sought to introduce protection against
the arbitrary power of inspectors, but rather upon the nature of the protection
intended, then Biswell does not signal any significant curtailment of that protection.
A close look at the line of cases ending in Biswell, particularly See, shows
an intention on the part of the Court to create protections in the area of administrative search different from those which have come to be associated with the
warrant through its use in criminal proceedings. Rather, the Court has paralleled the protection already provided against arbitrary use by administrative
agencies of their subpoena power.10 If this is what was intended in 1967, then
the entire line of cases is neither inconsistent nor formalistic as they would appear
to be if focus were placed upon the warrant requirement alone. This note explores this hypothesis and looks beyond procedure to the substance of the protection against arbitrary administrative action which the Court has attempted to
provide, thereby clarifying an otherwise confusing line of cases.
II. Historical Background
A. The Boyd and Frank Cases
The earliest Supreme Court case to examine the constitutionality of administrative searches was Boyd v. United States," overturning a statute 2 granting
authority to compel surrender of private papers which might constitute evidence
of tax fraud. In its reasoning the Court considered the protective measures of
the fourth amendment as designed to secure the freedom from self-incrimination
guaranteed by the fifth amendment. Therefore, searches which gave rise to no
fifth amendment problems were not to be subjected to the warrant requirement
of the fourth amendment.' 3
Subsequently, in Frank v. Maryland" the Court relied upon the distinction
7 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
8 406 U.S. at 315.
9 See, e.g., 22 CATH. U. L. Rav. 496 (1973); 11 DUQUESNE L. Rv. 253 (1972); 50
J. URB. L. 537 (1973); 43 Mss. L.J. 562 (1972).
10 See generally, 1 K. DAvis, ADmimSTRATrVE LAw §'§ 3.03, 3.12 (1958), §§ 3.04, 3.06,
3.11, 3.12 (Supp. 1970).
11 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
12 Act of June 22, 1874, § 5, 18 Stat. 186.
13 116 U.S. at 624. 633.
14 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
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between criminal searches and administrative investigations, which had been
made throughout American history, in order to uphold a fine for refusal to permit
a public health inspector to enter a private dwelling. The Court specifically held
that warrants were not required for such inspections. 5 But the Court was
divided, and there was a vigorous dissent which relied heavily upon the one lower
court decision applying the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment to
administrative inspections. '
B. The Camara and See Cases
By the time Camarav. Municipal Court' and See v. City of Seatle,8 were
decided, two members of the majority in Frank had been replaced. In Camara
the Court reversed a conviction for refusing a health inspector entry into a private
dwelling when he was unable to produce a warrant. In doing so the Court overruled Frank v. Maryland, to the extent that it had upheld warrantless administrative inspections as reasonable under the fourth amendment'
The Court rejected the civil-criminal dichotomy of older cases and concluded that the applicability of the fourth amendment should not depend upon
the nature of the search, but rather upon the need to "safeguard the privacy and
security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by government officials." 2 The
opinion set forth the rule that where there is no emergency demanding immediate access, and no warrant is obtained for an inspection, there is a constitutional right to insist that a warrant be obtained and anyone refusing entry to an
inspector without a warrant
constitutionally cannot be convicted for refusing to
2
consent to the inspection. '
In See a conviction for refusing to permit a representative of the City of
Seattle Fire Department to enter and inspect a locked commercial warehouse
was reversed.22 In effect the Court simply extended the Camararule to business
premises: "[A]dministrative entry, without consent, upon the portions of commercial premises which are not open to the public may only be compelled through
prosecution or physical force within the framework of a warrant procedure."2
III. The Impact of Camaraand See
A. The Limits of the Rule
First, it was not intended that these decisions should impede administrative
inspections and it was presumed that inspection programs to which the warrant
requirement applied would normally continue upon consent; only rarely would
a refusal make it necessary to seek a warrant.24
15

Id. at 373.

18
19

387 U.S. 541 '(1967).
Id. at 528.

16 Id. at 377, citing District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
17 387 U.S. 521 (1967).
20
21
22
23
24

387 U.S. at 528.
Id. at 540.
Id. at 542.
Id. at 545.
Id. at 539-40.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[April 1974]

Second, both Camaraand See indicated there would be circumstances when
it would not be practical to seek a warrant. Camara specifically excepted from
the warrant requirement prompt inspections traditionally upheld in emergency
situations. The examples given made it clear that "emergency" would be more
liberally construed than in a criminal context2
Third, there was also the suggestion that should some public need justify
inspection and the goals of inspection could not be achieved within the confines
of a reasonable requirement for a warrant, a warrant would not be required.26
In regard to business premises the Court made it clear in See that it was
not challenging regulatory techniques such as "licensing programs which require
inspections prior to operating a business or marketing a product;" these programs
would need to be examined on a case-by-case basis.2 If read literally, the quoted
language applies only to a small number of licensing schemes, but neither lower
courts nor later decisions of the Supreme Court have given restrictive meaning to
the language "prior to."28
Clearly the Court did not intend the warrant requirement to override all
other considerations or to value the right to privacy above the public need for
inspections. Therefore, only when the two were not inconsistent was the warrant
to be required.
B. Reasonableness and Probable Cause
1. Analogy to Administrative Subpoenas
In Frank v.Maryland the Court found that administrative inspections were
reasonable within the meaning of the fourth amendment, and concluded from
this that warrants would not be required.29 In contrast, the Court in Camara
said that even though administrative inspections in general were "reasonable",
under normal circumstances they would not be exempted from the warrant
requirement and its attendant showing of probable cause.' While the Court in
Frank differentiated the requirements for administrative inspections from those
for criminal searches on the basis of "reasonableness," the Camara Court based
its distinction on the definition of probable cause.
In discussing probable cause sufficient to justify the issuance of a warrant,
the Court adopted the rule: "If a valid public interest justifies the intrusion contemplated, then there is probable cause.

.

."" In support the Court cited Okla-

homa Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 2 a decision concerning the power of
administrative agencies to issue subpoenas. In Oklahoma Press the Court said
25 Id. at 539. The Court mentioned seizure of unwholesome food, health quarantines, and
the destruction of diseased cattle.
26 Id. at 533.
27 Id. at 546.
28 E.g., Biswell itself involved the inspection of a business which had already begun to
operate with a product already marketed.
29 See text accompanying note 15 supra.
30 387 U.S. at 534.
31 Id. at 539.
32 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
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that administrative subpoenas amount to "constructive" searches. 3 From this
the Court in See concluded that if the fourth amendment applied to administrative "constructive" searches, it certainly must apply to actual searches. 4
The Court's earlier rulings applying the fourth amendment to administrative subpoenas were precedents which had left the agencies with wide latitude
within which their actions could be construed as justifiable. The Court had
begun by insisting that it was unjust to permit fishing expeditions in the hopes
that something would turn up and that a subpoena should issue only when
there was reason to believe the documents sought contained evidence that the
law had been violated. 5 This doctrine eroded to the point that an agency did
not need to prove that particular information which it sought was relevant so
long as the subject matter was within the agency's jurisdiction. 8 Furthermore,
as long as the agency was authorized to investigate the subject matter of the
material sought by subpoena, it became possible to subpoena not only to determine if there was a violation but even to determine whether it was within the
agency's power to regulate.3 Finally, the Court made it clear that administrative
subpoenas would issue more freely than those of courts and would not be limited
by the technical concepts of relevance or immateriality."
The mechanics of the administrative subpoena procedure permits an agency
to issue its own process, but reserves to the courts the power to enforce the subpoenas if they are challenged. 9 Therefore, before refusal to comply can result
in any penalty, the person subject to the subpoena may have a court determine
if the agency is engaged in a lawful subject of inquiry, whether the scope is reasonably specific, and whether the subpoena is intended simply to harass.4 ° Thus,
the procedure .gives agencies very broad substantive scope, permits the great
majority of subpoenas to become operative upon consent, and provides a review
which prevents arbitrary action and allows a right to challenge agency action
before any penalty is imposed for failure to cooperate.
A result similar to that secured by the administrative subpoena process was
obtained by the Court in Camara. Inspections would normally continue upon
permission, without judicial review, just as most administrative subpoenas are
honored without the need for judicial review. However, the decision requires a
judicial review of the proposed administrative action before compliance can be
demanded or refusal to cooperate can be treated as an offense, which is also
true in the subpoena process.
2. Distinction Between Administrative and Criminal Searches in the
Probable Cause Requirement
The procedure for securing judicial review of a search had always been the
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

Id. at 202.
387 U. S. at 545.
FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298 (1924).
Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501 (1943).
Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950).
387 U.S. at 544-45.
Id.
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warrant requirement. Since the warrant had been a creature of the criminal
realm, its introduction to administrative inspections created considerable confusion about the intended standard of judicial review. The Court attempted to
avoid this by creating standards different from those applicable to warrants for
criminal searches, just as standards for administrative subpoenas had been distinguished from those for court subpoenas. The fourth amendment requirement
of reasonableness was defined to cover both criminal and administrative investigation, but to permit different standards of review for each. 1 The question of
whether a particular type of search is reasonable is to be answered by determining
if a legitimate government interest exists to justify an intrusion upon constitutionally protected rights of the citizen." This is not the kind of question which
would need to be re-evaluated every time a warrant is sought. For example,
there is no question that police searches for stolen goods are justified. Equally
justified are inspections for unsanitary conditions in food processing and storage
facilities or inspections for violations of housing and fire codes.4 The Court
found administrative searches to be reasonable upon the grounds they had long
been accepted by the public and the judiciary, and were necessary to insure
that conditions dangerous to the public interest were prevented or abated. Further the Court doubted that any means of enforcement except inspections would
be effective, and they did not seriously invade personal privacy since such inspections are nonpersonal and not intended to discover evidence of crime. 4
In addition to a determination that a type of search is reasonable, there is
the question of whether a particularsearch is reasonable, and this is determined
by inquiring whether there is probable cause for the search.' 5 "Probable cause"
in general terms, is the standard by which a decision to search is tested against
the constitutional requirement of reasonableness. In criminal law establishment
of probable cause requires a showing that something is connected with a crime
and that it will probably be found in the place to be searched. Thus probable
cause tests a particular search against the general standard of reasonableness.
There can be no public interest in random or indiscriminate searches for contraband.4"
If administrative inspections, such as the area-wide search involved in
Camara, are to be feasible, as they should be once it is determined that they
are reasonable, probable cause must not have the narrow meaning it has acquired
in criminal law. It is not reasonable, nor is it in the public interest, to permit
the police to search an entire city for stolen goods and therefore, in the criminal
context, a narrow definition of probable cause is justified.47 But since the primary
purpose of inspection is to prevent on a city-wide basis the development of hazardous conditions, there is a strong public interest in area inspections without
regard to whether there is reason to suspect violations in a particular building.4 8
41

Id.

at 534-35.

42
43
44
45
46
47
48

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 535.
at 537.
at 538.
at 534.
at 535.
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A showing of probable cause of the kind required in the criminal area would
render administrative inspections only corrective at best and largely defeat their
preventive purpose.
Therefore, the Court suggested as factors which would establish probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant to make an administrative inspection such
things as the passage of time, nature of the building to be inspected, and condition of the area where the building is located. If a general rule is to be found,
it is that "probable cause" exists "if reasonable legislative or administrative
standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling."49 This is a standard much nearer to that for the review of
administrative subpoenas than to that required to warrant criminal searches.
IV. The Interim: From See to Biswell
A. Application of the Camara-See Rule
The warrant requirements of Camara and See subsequently were found
applicable to a number of federal regulatory schemes, such as the Food, Drug
and Cosmetics Act,5" the Federal Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act, 51 and the Gun Control Act."

The agencies generally continued

making inspections upon consent.5 However, since a warrantless inspection was
not valid unless consent had been given, when violations were discovered those
culpable often sought to contest the validity of the consent given for the inspection. Probable cause, which is necessary for any reasonable search, was also
litigated, but the theories put forth were drawn from criminal law and clearly
contrary to the requirements Camara had established for administrative inwere not great, the lower courts
spections. 4 When the abuses of the inspector
5
litigation.
consent
to
sympathetic
not
were
The most thoughtful opinion on the consent issue was United States v.
Thriftimart, Inc."' in which the court began with the Supreme Court's recognition that the constitutionality of administrative searches and criminal searches
must be tested by different standards. From this premise the court reached the
conclusion that there need be no warning of a right to insist upon a warrant,
that failure to give such warning did not make the consent unknowing or involuntary, and that any manifestation of consent, no matter how casual, could be
accepted as a waiver of the right to insist upon a warrant.57 An implicit presumption of consent to administrative searches was held to exist whenever there
is acquiescence, based upon the inevitability of such inspections, the probable
cause standard, and the nature of the searches which are less coercive than crim49
50
51
52
53
States
54
55

387 U.S. at 538.
United States v. Thriftimart, Inc., 429 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1970).
United States v. Greenberg, 334 F. Supp. 364 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
United States v. Biswell, 442 F.2d 1189 (10th Cir. 1971).
E.g., the procedures used by inspectors of the Food and Drug Administration. United
v. Thriftimart, Inc., 429 F.2d 1006, 1008 (9th Cir. 1970).
E.g., United States v. Thriftimart, 429 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1970).
E.g., United States v. Hammond Milling Co., 413 F.2d 608 (5th Cir. 1969).

56 429 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1970).

57

Id. at 1010.
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inal searches by armed police, who are more likely to take a citizen by surprise
and unaware of the consequences of consent." If inspections were to proceed
upon consent, frequent litigation of consent whenever a violation was discovered
would impede the administrative process, which the Court in Camara made
clear was not its intent. 9
B. The Liquor Law Exception
In Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, the Supreme Court required the suppression of evidence obtained by federal agents who entered appellant's liquor storage area by force." In doing so, however, they found an exception to the See rule that inspection without consent may only be compelled by
force or prosecution within the context of a warrant procedure. Though the
only license involved was a state liquor license, inspections under the liquor
laws were found to be under one of the "licensing programs" which See had
reserved for resolution on a case-by-case basis. 1 The Court accepted the position
that inspections under the liquor laws are not unreasonable because they have
never been found to be so. In the year the fourth amendment was ratified,
Congress provided for warrantless inspection of the premises of liquor distillers
and importers. Boyd v. United States had recognized this special treatment.
Therefore, the Court concluded that in this area it was proper to permit Congress to establish standards for searches.6" However, because Congress failed to
make rules governing inspection procedure, the fourth amendment applied; and
since the statutes did not specifically authorize force, the only recourse when
entry was refused was the statutory fine.63
It is the Colonnade holding, finding an exception to See in which a search
authorized by statute may be reasonable without a warrant, which is extended
by the Biswell decision."
V. The Biswell Decision
Biswell was a pawnshop owner who had a federal license to deal in sporting
58

Id. at 1009.

59
60

387 U.S. at 539.
397 U.S. 72 (1970).

61 Id. at 76-77.
62 Id. at 75-76.
63 Id. at 77.
64 Between Colonnade and Biswell the Court decided Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309
(1917), holding that home visits by welfare workers were not searches subject to the fourth
amendment even though the information gathered from the visits might result in the reduction or termination of payments for the support of dependent children. The Court also held
that even if the home visitation were a search, it would not be barred by the fourth amendment because it would not be "unreasonable." 400 U.S. at 317-18.
The Court distinguished Camara and See on the grounds that in those situations there was
more than a mere interview, but rather genuine searches were involved. Also in each case
criminal prosecution for refusing entry was involved, whereas in Wyman only loss of welfare
resulted from refusal to permit official entry. 400 U.S. at 324-25.
Therefore, immediately prior to Biswell, the Court required of administrative actions falling short of technical search, and of searches which cannot result in criminal penalties, only
that they be reasonable. If an inspection may result in criminal penalties, or if such penalties
are imposed upon refusal to permit search, then there must be either consent or a warrant,
unless the search falls within one of the categories excepted by Camara or See.
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rifles. An investigator from the Treasury Department visited the shop, identified
himself, inspected Biswell's books, and requested entry to his gun storeroom
which was locked. Biswell inquired whether the investigator had a warrant,
and he replied that he did not, but that the Federal Gun Control Act6" authorized
the inspection. Upon being shown a copy of the law, Biswell replied, "Well,
that's what it says so I guess it's okay." The agent seized two weapons in which
Biswell's license did not authorize him to deal."8 The district court convicted
Biswell of dealing in firearms without paying the required occupational tax.
The court of appeals reversed on the grounds that the appellant had not validly
consented, and the statute authorizing inspections with neither a warrant nor
consent was unconstitutional.67 The Supreme Court granted certiorari" and
reversed upon the grounds that the statute was constitutional, a search authorized
by such a statute was reasonable, and that where such a search proceeded upon
the authorization of a statute no consent was needed.69
The Biswell decision carved out an exception to See for inspections of business premises pursuant to federal regulatory schemes. Biswell involved a licensing
program under the Gun Control Act of 1968; however, the decision is not limited
in its application only to licensing programs.7
Whereas the Colonnade opinion limited statutory authorization for administrative searches to liquor regulation, where they could be justified as reasonable
upon the basis of a unique historical treatment, Biswell gave broad approval
to statutory authorization, abandoning the historical test and replacing it with
the broader criterion of whether the scheme is to further an "urgent federal
interest."71 However, it is apparent from the considerations upon which the
reasonableness of the warrantless inspection in Biswell was based that no carte
blanche to replace warrant procedures by statutory authorization was intended.
Those considerations were:
(1) The inspection was a crucial part of a regulatory scheme in which
"large interests" were at stake."'
(2) The law could not properly be enforced and the inspection made
effective unless inspection without a warrant was deemed reasonable
conduct."
It is upon this second factor that the Court distinguished the situation in Biswell
from that in See. In See the defects subject to inspection, those in building struc65

18 U.S.C. §§ 921, 923(g) (1970).

66

United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 312 (1972).

67

442 F.2d 1189 (10th Cir. 1971).

68

404 U.S. 983 (1971).

69

406 U.S. at 312.

70 United States v. Schafer, 461 F.2d 856 (9th Cir. 1972) (Plant Quarantine Act); United
States v. Business Builders, Inc., 354 F. Supp. 141 (N.D. Okla. 1973); United States v. Del
Campo Baking Mfg. Co., 345 F. Supp. 1371 (D. Del. 1972) (Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act); United States v. Montrom, 345 F. Supp. 1337 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970).
71 406 U.S. at 317.
72 Id. at 315.
73 Id. at 316.
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ture, were relatively difficult to remedy or conceal in a short period of time. In
Biswell the objects of inspection, guns, were easily and quickly concealed. Therefore, if the normal routine of inspection under the Federal Gun Control Act is to
proceed without a warrant until one is demanded, as the Camararule anticipated
administrative inspections would proceed, 4 then any violator could simply refuse
to consent to the inspection and conceal the evidence of his violation while the
inspector sought the necessary warrant.
(3) It would not be possible to establish a standard for obtaining a
warrant which would offer any significant protection to the appellant
and still provide sufficient flexibility in the search scheme to make it an
effective means of enforcement.75
To avoid this dilemma an inspector would have to possess himself of a large
number of warrants before setting out on his rounds. Issuance of warrants in
such numbers and in ex parte proceedings would become a mere formality,
diluting the standard of probable cause even further, and leaving the court with
no indication of when an inspector's conduct has been challenged and thus
deserves special scrutiny as is the case when warrants are sought only after consent is refused.
(4) The search involved only limited threats to justifiable expectations
of privacy.
Biswell was engaged of his own choice in a "pervasively regulated industry"'
and had obtained a federal license to engage in the firearms trade. He did so
knowing that certain records and goods would be inspected. Furthermore the
administrators of the Federal Gun Control Act provided licenses with an annual
compilation of ordinances so that licenses were on notice of the law governing
inspection of their business. 7 Therefore, one of the concerns expressed by the
8
the need for notice of the inspector's identity and powers,
Court in Camara,"
was not present when an inspection was subject to a regulatory scheme of this
kind. Even without a warrant, there was notice of the inspector's authority, of
the necessity of inspecting the particular premises as part of an administrative
scheme, and of the scope of inspection. Any doubt of such notice was removed
by the presentation to Biswell of a copy of the statute authorizing inspection.'
Once an inspection is determined to be pursuant to a proper regulatory
scheme, there are standards which a statute must meet before its authorizations
of a warrantless search may be deemed reasonable: "In the context of a regulatory inspection system of business premises that is carefully limited in time, place,
and scope, the legality of the search depends not on consent but on the authority
74
75
76
77
78
79

387
406
Id.
Id.
387
406

U.S. at 539.
U.S. at 316.
U.S. at 532.
U.S. at 312.
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of a valid statute.""0 The Gun Control Act of 1968 authorizes entry "during
business hours, ... to the premises (including places of storage) of any firearms
or ammunition importer, manufacturer, dealer, or collector, . .. for the purpose
of inspecting or examining . .. records or documents required to be kept ...
and... any firearms or ammunition ....
"I A lower court has upheld less precise language which refers to inspection "at reasonable times," within "reasonable limits," of warehouses containing food products subject to federal regulations.2 However, in neither of these two statutes is the language as imprecise
as that in the ordinance at issue in See v. City of Seattle.3
VI. Conclusion:

Consequences of Biswell

The first and most direct result of Biswell is to eliminate the necessity of
consent once a regulatory scheme and a valid statute are found. In such circumstances the legality of the inspection depends upon neither a warrant nor
consent."
Second, within the context of such a qualifying regulatory scheme, it is
permissible to establish statutory penalties for refusal to permit inspection even
when no warrant was presented by the inspector as required by Camaraand See:
Respondent's submission to lawful authority and his decision to step aside
and permit the inspection rather than face a criminal prosecution is analogous to a householder's acquiescence in a search pursuant to a warrant
when the alternative is a possible criminal prosecution for refusing entry
or a forcible entry.85
Third, this decision taken with Colonnade, opens the further possibility
that a legislative scheme specifically authorizing forcible entry might be upheld.
In Colonnade,with respect to liquor regulation, while the Court found Congress
had the authority "to design such powers of inspection under the liquor laws
as it deems necessary.. .," the Court did not find such authority in the statute
at issue. 7 However, the dissenting justices would have found that the right to
use force was implied in the authority to search areas where liquor is stored. 8
The statute involved in Biswell also failed to give specific authority to use force, 9
however, there was nothing in the opinion that indicates a provision for the use
of force would be found unconstitutional. The analogy used by the Court, 0
80 Id. at 315.

81

18 U.S.C. § 923(g) (1970).

83

SEATTLE, WASH.,

82

88 United States v. Del Campo Baking Mfg. Co., 345 F. Supp. 1371 (D. Del. 1972).
INSPECTION

FRE CODE § 8.01.050:

OF BUILDINGS AND PREMISES.

It shall be the duty of the Fire Chief

to inspect and he may enter all buildings and premises, except the interiors of dwellings, as often as may be necessary for the purpose of ascertaining and causing to be
corrected any conditions liable to cause fire, or aiy violations of the provisions of this
Title, and of any other ordinance concerning fire hazards.

84 406 U.S. at 315.

85 Id.
86 397 U.S. at 76.
87 Id.
88 397 U.S. at 78 (Burger, C. J., Black & Stewart, JJ., dissenting).
89 406 U.S. 311.
90 See text accompanying note 85 supra.
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and its holding that inspections such as that in Biswell are legal independent of
consent or warrant, strongly suggests that a legislative authorization to inspect by
force would be upheld. One lower court has already reached this conclusion. 1
In regard to inspections subject to statutory schemes of regulation the Court
has come to a position close to that which it held in Frank v. Maryland. This is
true to the extent that in a large number of situations neither a warrant nor
consent is required for a valid administrative search. Yet Biswell does not give
blanket permission for all administrative searches to proceed without warrants;
Camara and See have not been overruled. Thus the warrant can be dispensed
with only if two conditions are met: first, the authorizing statute must contain
standards limiting the time, place, and scope of the inspections; and second, the
scheme of regulation must be so pervasive that those subject to inspection will
have been put on notice by their own familiarity with the statutes and the frequent visits of inspectors.
When the inspection is of business premises under a federal regulatory
scheme governed by a properly drafted statute everything is accomplished without a warrant which its presence would accomplish in inspections of the type
involved in Camaraand See. The purposes of a warrant as described in Camara
(judicial review, and notice of the need, scope, and authority of the inspection)
are equally satisfied under Biswell by a sufficiently precise statute applicable to
businessmen who are aware that they are being regulated. Under both, warrant
and statute limitations are placed upon the discretion of the inspector in the
field, by the terms of the warrant in the first instance, and by the inspectee's
knowledge of the inspector's statutory authority in the other. In either a See
or a Biswell situation, the person subject to inspection has no opportunity to
participate in a hearing prior to search. A two party hearing upon the propriety
of the search can be obtained only after the inspection is completed. Refusal
to honor inspection under either the warrant or the statute may result in penalties. Even if Biswell permits force, so does a warrant. Finally the review of
probable cause upon which an administrative search warrant will issue under
Camara and See amounts only to a determination that it is part of a reasonable
legislative and administrative scheme.92 It is precisely such schemes which Biswell

requires and for which it establishes standards.
Because of the exceptions made for licensing schemes in See and for federal
regulatory schemes in Biswell, the warrant requirement and the related issues of
consent and probable cause will be inapplicable to a great number of administrative inspections. The court has followed the track back very close to where it
began with its holding in Frank v. Maryland that administrative inspections are
free from the warrant requirement. But the circle is not complete; the Court
has at least provided for controls over administrative searches analogous to those
already established over administrative subpoena powers.
Harold Pope

91 United States v. Montrom, 345 F. Supp. 1337, 1339 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (dictum).

92 387 U.S. at 538.

